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Abstract 
 
Sexual assault in prisons is a shameful phenomenon in the United States. According to 
the Department of Justice, over 200,000 individuals are sexually abused in confinement 
annually. In response to this human rights crisis, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination 
Act (PREA) in 2003 with the intention of creating measures to protect inmates from this abuse. 
Since then, PREA standards for different types of confinement facilities were passed, auditing of 
facilities began, and changes regarding the auditing process were made as various shortcomings 
became apparent. In prior research, I explored if PREA audit-related reforms were successful in 
resulting in higher quality prison audits than had previously been conducted (specifically, in 
Alabama). Disappointingly, I found that they were not and that Alabama’s audits were 
alarmingly inadequate. This led me to my present question, which seeks to uncover whether 
increased state punitiveness is correlated with decreased PREA audit robustness. Based on the 
auditor application and certification process, I hypothesize that a relationship between state 
punitiveness and audit robustness does not exist. To answer this question, I examine three audits 
from each of three different states that vary significantly in their supposed punitiveness. I explore 
five distinct factors that I believe are indicative of audit robustness and examine how each of the 
nine audits performs in relation to these factors. I find that, based on these measures, increased 
state punitiveness does not appear to be associated with decreased audit robustness. 
 
 
 
 
Disclaimer: This research is an expansion of research done on a similar topic using the same 
methods in the fall of 2019. As such, where applicable, portions of the previous paper—with 
their original citations and with permission from my academic advisor— have been included in 
the Introduction, Methods and Research Strategy, Background, Findings and Analysis, and 
Conclusion sections.  
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I. Introduction  
The rates of both sexual assault and incarceration in the U.S. are alarming. Every 98 
seconds, someone is sexually assaulted in the U.S. (Bureau of Justice Statistics, 2017). At the 
same time, with about 5% of the world’s population, the U.S. lays claim to 25% of the world’s 
prisoners, meaning that we imprison our population at a rate 6-10 times higher than any other 
industrialized country and more frequently even than repressive regimes (Alexander, 2011). 
Through my research, I explore the intersection of these two phenomena and examine the role 
that legislation and policy implementation have in protecting inmates from sexual assault in 
confinement.  
The Prison Rape Elimination Act (PREA) was signed into law in 2003 as a means of 
addressing sexual assault behind bars. As part of this legislation, in 2012, the Department of 
Justice released PREA national standards for confinement facilities to abide by, with the 
intention that 1) compliance with these standards would create environments in which inmates 
were protected from sexual assault in the first place and 2) if an inmate did experience sexual 
assault, there would be an effective system in place to report the incident and have it 
investigated. In order to determine compliance, these standards also require that the facilities be 
audited once every three years (Department of Justice, 2012). 
After the first audit cycle ended in 2016, the PREA Management Office (PMO)—the 
body within the Department of Justice responsible for audit oversight— concluded that audits 
were not being completed as thoroughly as desired. Thus, in 2017 and 2018, changes in how 
auditors are trained and how audits are conducted were implemented with the hope that they 
would increase audit robustness (J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). 
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The research I completed in the fall looked to explore the impact of these reforms. It 
asked the question, “How did changes that occurred in 2017 and 2018 regarding PREA prison 
audits affect the robustness of these audits?". Comparing the 2016 audits (pre-reform) of two 
Alabama prisons with each facility’s respective 2018 audit (post-reform), I found that—at least 
based on my selected robustness measures—the changes did not appear to improve audit 
robustness. 
II. Question and Hypothesis 
 I was surprised to find that the 2017 and 2018 PREA audit-related changes did not result 
in more robust audits, and I was also alarmed by just how poor the Alabama audits appeared to 
be. This spurred curiosity about whether or not audits across the country are equally as weak. 
Furthermore, I was aware that Alabama is one of the most punitive states in the country, and so I 
wondered if the punitiveness of a given state had any relationship to the quality of PREA audits 
completed on that state’s incarceration facilities. 
 Thus, I was lead to the research question I explore in this paper, that is, “How does a 
state’s punitiveness relate to the robustness of the PREA prison audits conducted within its 
borders?”.  
 After doing some research on the PREA auditor application and certification process, I 
hypothesize that the supposed punitiveness of a state should not have a correlation with the 
quality of its PREA audits. The auditor certification process will be discussed in more detail 
below, but in short, all auditor candidates must complete the same, federally-organized 
certification process. No specific training is done at the state level (National PREA Resource 
Center, 2018c). Therefore, in theory, all auditors go through the same certification process and 
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there is no reason to believe that an auditor conducting audits in a more punitive state should be 
any less equipped than an auditor conducting audits in a less punitive state. 
 What is more, once you become a certified auditor, you may conduct audits in any state 
(J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). Indeed, I was surprised to find that for 
all nine of the facility audits I examine, the auditors had traveled from their states of residence in 
order to conduct the audit. With this in mind, even if one wanted to make the (rather unsound) 
claim that perhaps an auditor from a more punitive state might also be of a more punitive 
mindset and thus less caring toward inmates and less meticulous in their audits, that argument 
would not be relevant here. 
III. Methods and Research Strategy 
 As mentioned above, the intent of this research is to examine PREA audits on prisons in 
states of different punitiveness in order to see if the harshness of the state’s incarceration 
practices has any noticeable relationship to the quality of its audits.  In 2016, the Pew Research 
Center assigned each of the U.S. states a “punishment rank” (1-50) based on its perceived 
punitiveness (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). I use this ranking system to select a relatively 
punitive state (ranked 1-10), a relatively non-punitive state (ranked 40-50), and a state that falls 
in the middle (20-30), and examine three recent PREA prison audits from each of those selected 
states (so, nine audits in total).  
Given the relatively short amount of time I had to complete this research, I chose to re-
use Alabama (punishment rank: 9) audits I had examined in my initial research so that I could do 
my best to maximize the total number of audits I include in this paper. Thus, I re-use findings 
from the 2018 Elmore Correctional Facility audit and the 2018 Easterling Correctional Facility 
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audit. I then randomly selected one more recent Alabama PREA prison audit, which ended up 
being on Holman Correctional Facility in 2017. 
As a control, I decided to study audits from states with relatively similar population sizes. 
Accordingly, I looked at the states with punishment rankings 20-30 and 40-50 and saw which 
ones were closest in population size to Alabama. Upon looking for audit records, I found that a 
number of states do not have them publicly available online, making them inaccessible for my 
purposes (to request hard copies would have taken perhaps weeks to process). In sum, I ended up 
examining audits from the two states that fell into the 20-30 punishment rank window and the 
40-50 window, whose populations were closest to that of Alabama’s and whose audits were 
accessible online. These two states are Oregon (punishment rank: 29) and Minnesota 
(punishment rank: 46). 
I quasi-randomly selected three recent (conducted between 2017 and 2019) audits from 
each of these two states. The only non-random aspect of the facility selection process at this time 
was that I chose not to examine two audits conducted by the same auditor. Thus, if I randomly 
selected an audit and it happened to be conducted by the auditor of one of the facilities already 
chosen, I would move on to the next randomly selected audit until I had three facility audits from 
both Oregon and Minnesota, all conducted by different auditors. 
I re-use a number of the robustness measures I had created for my initial research. These 
include: Was each PREA standard addressed in full? Was policy existence used as the sole proof 
of policy implementation? Was the required minimum number of inmates interviewed? Was 
inmate interview evidence cited where appropriate? Was there any contradictory evidence? 
To collect my data, I read each audit line by line. I looked at the compliance 
determinations for all of the 43 PREA national standards and paid particularly close attention to 
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the Auditor Discussion sections for each standard because these discussions are required to 
include “the comprehensive discussion of all the evidence [italics mine] relied upon in making 
the compliance or non-compliance determination, the auditor’s analysis and reasoning, and the 
auditor’s conclusions” (National PREA Resource Center, 2018b, p. 7). I noted each time 
something in an audit appeared to be deficient regarding any of my five chosen robustness 
measures. For each measure, I summed the number of deficiency instances for each state and 
found the percentage of total standards affected by this deficiency. I compared these three 
percentages, deeming that the findings supported my hypothesis if there did not exist a trend 
indicating that increased state punitiveness correlated with decreased audit robustness. 
IV. Background  
A. Origin of PREA 
Sexual assault has likely run rampant in U.S. confinement facilities since their inception. 
Even in recent years, experts estimate that around 200,000 individuals annually are sexually 
abused under conditions of confinement (Just Detention International, 2016). For a number of 
reasons, sexual abuse behind bars was ignored throughout most of U.S. history. Often, people 
were unaware of the abuse, denied the phenomenon’s reality, or else would simply claim that the 
mistreatment of inmates was permissible due to the belief that inmates are “criminal.” However, 
beginning in the late 1970s, more and more victims began to speak out about their abuse and 
seek reparations. One individual, prison rape survivor Russell Smith, went so far as to found an 
organization dedicated to addressing the crisis. People Organized to Stop the Rape of Imprisoned 
Persons—now known as Just Detention International (JDI)—was founded in 1980 and remains 
the only organization in the U.S. devoted exclusively to ending sexual assault in confinement 
(Just Detention International, 2016). 
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Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, prison sexual assault survivors continued to be vocal 
and take their cases to court. Media representation further amplified their voices, and soon the 
phenomenon of sexual assault behind bars became common knowledge. Finally, in 2002, a letter 
from then-JDI-president Tom Cahill inspired congressional representatives to begin the push for 
legislation to address the crisis. Their efforts came to fruition in 2003, when the Prison Rape 
Elimination Act (PREA) was passed unanimously by both chambers of Congress and signed into 
law by President George W. Bush (Just Detention International, 2016). 
The act states that it intends “to provide for the analysis of the incidence and effects of 
prison rape in Federal, State, and local institutions and to provide information, resources, 
recommendations, and funding to protect individuals from prison rape” (108th Congress, 2003, p. 
1). The legislation further claims that it has nine purposes ranging from “establishing a zero-
tolerance standard for the incidence of prison rape in prisons in the United States” to 
“standardizing the definitions used for collecting data on the incidence of prison rape” (108th 
Congress, 2003, p. 3). Another of these purposes is to “develop and implement national 
standards for the detection, prevention, reduction, and punishment of prison rape” (108th 
Congress, 2003, p. 3). To meet this end, it established the eight-member bipartisan National 
Prison Rape Elimination Commission (NPREC).1 To pressure facilities into compliance, PREA 
establishes that any state whose facilities are not in accordance with the future standards will 
receive a 5% reduction in the annual federal grant money allocated to the state for prison 
purposes (108th Congress, 2003, p. 15).2  
																																																								
1 The Chair of NPREC was Federal district judge, Reggie B. Walton. Vice-chair was John A. 
Kaneb. Other Commissioners include James E. Aiken, Jamie Fellner, Pat Nolan, Gustavus A. Puryear IV, 
Brenda V. Smith, and Cindy Struckman-Johnson (National Prison Rape Elimination Commission, 2009). 
 
2 Each year, every state is expected to submit to the Attorney General a certification of 
compliance with the PREA national standards. Compliance must be proven with the results of the most 
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B. Release of PREA National Standards  
In 2012, nine years after the commission was created, NPREC submitted its final PREA 
national standards to the Department of Justice for approval and release. Notably, the final 
standards diverge from the original PREA legislation in that they go beyond merely addressing 
rape in prisons and instead address all forms of sexual assault in all types of confinement 
facilities (Department of Justice, 2012).  
 The standards are broken up into 13 sections— “Prevention Planning,” “Responsive 
Planning,” “Training and Education,” “Screening for Risk of Sexual Victimization and 
Abusiveness,” “Reporting,” “Official Response Following an Inmate Report,” “Investigations,” 
“Discipline,” “Medical and Mental Care,” “Data Collection and Review,” “Audits,” “Auditing 
and Corrective Action,” and “State Compliance” (Department of Justice, 2012). Each of these 
respective sections contains a number of standards (for example, Standard 115.11), and the vast 
majority of these standards is then further divided into lettered subsections (for example, 
Subsections 115.11(a), 115.11(b), and 115.11(c)). In total, there are 43 standards for which the 
audits must determine compliance (Department of Justice, 2012). 
C. 2017 and 2018 PREA Developments 
  Beginning in August of 2013, it became required for each U.S. incarceration facility to be 
audited at least once every three years (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 34). Thus, the first audit 
cycle ran from 2013-2016. After looking through this initial batch of audit results, the PREA 
Management Office (PMO)— who received the audits at the time— concluded that the audits 																																																																																																																																																																																		
recent audits on that state’s facilities. If the state is not in compliance, it receives the 5% reduction in 
federal prison grant money. The state also has the option to submit a statement of assurance (as opposed 
to a certification of compliance) claiming that the state’s facilities are not currently in compliance with the 
standards, but that they are working toward compliance. In this case, the state will be given its federal 
prison grant money in full, but at least 5% of that money is required to be used exclusively to achieve full 
compliance with the PREA national standards (108th Congress, 2003).   
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were not being conducted thoroughly enough, and that far too often, auditors were deeming 
facilities in compliance with given standards, but not adequately providing evidence supporting 
these compliance determinations. Consequently, the office sought to begin decertifying the 
auditors it found to be inadequate. However, the Department of Justice’s General Counsel 
advised PMO against decertification, claiming that the decertified auditors could sue with the 
argument that they had never been adequately trained or provided resources to conduct effective 
audits in the first place. This dispute between PMO and the Department of Justice General 
Counsel led PMO to implement a number of PREA audit-related reforms over the course of 2017 
and early 2018, with the intention that these changes would improve auditor training and 
reporting and make auditor expectations abundantly clear. Then, if PMO continued to find that 
audits remained inadequate during the next audit cycle, it would have sufficient evidence to 
prove that the auditors had been properly equipped to conduct thorough audits, and therefore 
could be decertified if their audits were found to be of poor quality (J. Abbate, personal 
communication, October 17, 2018). 
The first of these changes was the introduction of PREA Auditor Candidate Field 
Training as part of the auditor certification process. Before the implementation of this field 
training (during which auditor candidates conduct practice audits on real facilities and receive 
constructive criticism and advice), auditors were merely required to meet a set of minimum 
qualifications,3 pass a pre-training exam, complete the 40-hour in-class training program, and 
pass the post-training exam to become provisionally certified auditors.4 But beginning with the 																																																								
3 These qualifications include: three years of prior auditing experience, completion of a 
bachelor’s degree, references from professionals in the field, and approval after a criminal background 
check (PREA Management Office, 2017). 
 
4 The auditors are found to be fully certified if the PREA Management Office determines that 
their first two audits were completed adequately (J. Abbate, personal communication, 2018). 
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auditor class of July 2017, all auditor candidates were required to complete field training to 
become certified (J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). 
The second change was the introduction of the PREA Auditor Handbook and Auditor 
Certification Agreement, which were released in conjunction with one another in August 2017 
(J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). The Auditor Handbook serves as a 
comprehensive resource for auditors to refer back to throughout the audit process. It contains 
information regarding the expectations PMO has of auditors, how audits should be conducted, 
and potential consequences for not abiding by the given standards. Meanwhile, the Auditor 
Certification Agreement lays out conditions of auditor certification and auditor requirements 
established by the Department of Justice. The final step to become a provisionally certified 
auditor is to sign this agreement, indicating that you have completed all requirements and will 
continue to abide by the listed responsibilities, and acknowledging that if your work is found to 
be inadequate by PMO, that the office has the right to decertify you (PREA Management Office, 
2017). 
The final change regards a restructuring of the Auditor Report Template. In early 2018, 
an updated template was released on the National PREA Resource Center website.5 This 
template aimed to make the compliance determinations more clear and thorough. As such, it was 
more explicit in its expectations of auditor justifications for rulings of compliance/non-
compliance for each standard, as well as more detailed, allowing for all lettered subsections 
within each of the 43 standards to be addressed individually, as opposed to simply the standard 
in its entirety (as was the case in the template previously used). 																																																																																																																																																																																		
 
5 The National PREA Resource Center is funded by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, a body 
within the Department of Justice (J. Abbate, personal communication, 2018). 
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D. Audit Process Details  
As mentioned above, each agency is required to be audited once every three years. The 
onus is on the agency itself to schedule the audit and it does so by booking an auditor as an 
independent contractor or through an accreditation body (National PREA Resource Center, 
2018a). 
 Prior to the audit, the auditor provides the facility’s PREA Compliance Manager with a 
Pre-Audit Questionnaire to complete. This questionnaire includes questions regarding general 
facility details (population, number of housing units, etc.), as well as questions related to each of 
the 43 PREA standards. In answering the latter, the Compliance Manager is also required to 
provide supporting documentation (National PREA Resource Center, 2014b).  
 Before the onsite audit takes place, the facility must post notice of the audit with the 
auditor’s contact information in case inmates would like to engage in confidential 
communication with the auditor. Furthermore, the auditor is required to establish contact with 
victim advocacy groups in the area and solicit their opinion regarding inmate safety at the facility 
(National PREA Resource Center, 2014c). The onsite audit generally takes two to three days and 
includes a facility tour, staff and inmate interviews, and review of records. The auditor is 
required to tour the entire facility and has been trained to make specific observations such as the 
location of any blind spots and the level of supervision in a given room. The auditor is also 
encouraged to ask questions of the staff and inmates they come across on the tour, but these 
conversations are not considered to be part of the formal interviews (National PREA Resource 
Center, 2014d). 
 As far as the official interviews go, the auditor is provided distinct sets of questions to 
ask different types of staff members, as well as interview guidelines for the random and targeted 
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inmate interviews (National PREA Resource Center, 2014a). During the staff interviews, the 
auditor is expected to ask any questions they may have regarding information included in the 
Pre-Audit Questionnaire documentation, and can request additional records if they believe they 
are needed (J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). 
 Once the onsite audit is complete and the auditor has acquired all of the information they 
need, they input each of their 43 compliance determinations and justifications into the Auditor 
Report Template and submit the report (at this point considered an “interim report”) to the 
agency that oversees the facility. If the auditor finds that the facility is not in compliance with 
any standard, they work with the facility staff to develop a plan to achieve compliance. The 
facility then has 180 days (known as the corrective action period) to implement these changes 
and establish compliance. Within 30 days after the corrective action period ends, the auditor 
again submits the report (now considered the “final report”) to the agency. Within 15 days of 
submitting the final report to the agency, the auditor must also submit this report to the National 
PREA Resource Center. If the agency would like to contest the final audit findings, it has 90 
days from when it receives the report to contact the Department of Justice (National PREA 
Resource Center, 2014c). 
 Oversight of the audits by the PREA Management Office is not as thorough as one might 
expect. Initially, when auditors are considered to be only provisionally certified, they must 
submit their first two audit reports to PMO for review. If PMO finds that the auditor completed 
the audits well, then the auditors are deemed officially certified. However, aside from that, 
auditors are not required to submit their final reports to PMO. While an audit oversight plan6 is 																																																								
6 The Auditor Handbook states “on a regular basis, the PREA Management Office uses 
information collected from auditors through audit reporting forms, audit reports, complaints submitted by 
third party sources, their performance and engagement during oversight interventions…and the requested 
audit documentation to evaluate an auditor’s performance and identify targeted interventions and/or 
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in place, the vast majority of audits are never reviewed after they are completed, which results in 
many inadequate audits slipping through the cracks (J. Abbate, personal communication, October 
17, 2018).  
Although all audits are submitted to the National PREA Resource Center and a 
depository of all completed audit reports exists on the Bureau of Justice Assistance website, a list 
of past failed audits does not exist. Interestingly, due to the existence of the corrective action 
period and the fact that it is intended to address any issues of noncompliance before the final 
audit report is submitted, it is quite possible that a facility has never failed an audit (J. Abbate, 
personal communication, October 17, 2018). With that said, if a facility were to fail an audit, the 
state would not be in compliance with the PREA standards and it would lose 5% of its federal 
prison grant money (108th Congress, 2003). 
E. Summary of My Initial Research  
 As previously stated, the research done for this paper expands upon research I completed 
in the fall of 2018. My fall research looked to see if the PREA audit-related changes that took 
place in 2017 and 2018 appeared to have a positive impact on the quality of audits. Thus, it 
compared the robustness (measured by criteria that I created) of audits on the same facilities 
from before the reforms were implemented and after the reforms were implemented to look for 
changes over time. Disappointingly and surprisingly, I found that these reforms did not appear to 
improve audit robustness. With that said, the study had only examined four audits in total from 
two different facilities in the same state (Alabama), and hence could not be said to be a 
																																																																																																																																																																																		
sanctions that are responsive to the needs of and/or deficiencies identified with the auditor’s work” 
(PREA Management Office, 2017, p. 72). Four of these interventions/sanctions (Quality Improvement 
Program, Peer Review, Disciplinary Review, and Remediation) exist, and if they don’t adequately 
improve the auditor’s performance, then the auditor may be decertified (PREA Management Office, 
2017). 
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representative sample. My findings left me wondering if this audit weakness was unique to 
Alabama (as Alabama is known to be rather harsh regarding incarceration practices) or present in 
states across the country. Motivated by this curiosity, in this present study, I look to examine 
audits across multiple states of different levels of punitiveness to potentially discover patterns 
related to audit robustness. 
F. Punishment Rankings  
 Imprisonment rates—“the number of people in prison per 100,000 residents” (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2016)— are commonly used to measure how severely a given jurisdiction 
punishes crime. However, researchers at the Pew Research Center argue that this proxy for 
punishment, while useful, is incomplete. As such, the center has worked to develop a different, 
more nuanced metric, which it has dubbed a “punishment rate” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). 
 As opposed to the imprisonment rate, which “captures only the small subset of offenders 
who are apprehended, prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced to prison” and reflects “only the 
ratio of those inmates to residents,” the punishment rate “calculates the use of prison relative to 
the frequency and severity of reported crime in each jurisdiction” (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). 
It does so through the use of two distinct data points. The first is a jurisdiction’s imprisonment 
rate. The second is what Pew calls the jurisdiction’s “severity-weighted crime rate,” which:   
captures the frequency and seriousness of reported crime per 100,000 residents, as 
measured by the seven specific offenses for which reliable, national data are available 
and that the FBI classifies as Part I offenses: criminal homicide, rape, robbery, 
aggravated assault, burglary, larceny-theft, and motor vehicle theft. To account for 
differences in the severity of the offenses, Pew constructed a scale that assigns a weight 
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to each crime according to the average period of imprisonment served by offenders 
convicted and sentenced for it (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). 
Thus, the punishment rate seeks to contextualize imprisonment rates and serve as a more 
strategic measure of a jurisdiction’s punitiveness. Any given state may be more or less punitive 
than its imprisonment rate alone might indicate (Pew Charitable Trusts, 2016). 
 In 2016, using data from 1983 up to 2013 (which was the most recent reliable data 
available at the time), Pew released its list of state punishment rankings. It compared these 
rankings to the states’ imprisonment rankings, and interestingly, found that the two rankings for 
some states were quite similar, while the two rankings for others differed dramatically (Pew 
Charitable Trusts, 2016). If it is indeed true that the imprisonment rate leaves something to be 
desired, then the fact that the punishment rank can differ by 10+ for a significant number of 
states from those states’ imprisonment ranks provides some support for the claim that the 
punishment rate has the potential to be utilized as an important and insightful analytical tool. 
Consequently, this ranking system was the one I chose to rely upon when selecting states of 
different punitiveness to study. 
V. Findings and Analysis  
A. Addressing the Standard in Full  
 As previously mentioned, during each audit, the auditor is responsible for determining the 
facility’s compliance or non-compliance with 43 different PREA standards (Department of 
Justice, 2012). Again, within each of these standards are lettered subsections, and the auditor is 
expected to provide evidence proving compliance with each one. As I combed through the 
audits, I discovered that often the auditor would rule that the facility complies with a standard as 
a whole, but would not address all the lettered subsections of the standard in question. In the 
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Auditor Discussion sections for many standards, some of the subsections (or parts of the 
subsection) were outright unmentioned. 
Example 1 
 Subsection 115.71(j) states, “The departure of the alleged abuser or victim from the 
employment or control of the facility or agency shall not provide a basis for terminating an 
investigation” (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 27). This standard includes subsections A-L. 
While the auditor for the Two Rivers 2019 audit provides evidence for the majority of these 
subsections in the Auditor Discussion for this standard, she does not mention anything at all 
about subsection J. Despite not addressing all aspects of this standard, she rules that the facility 
is in compliance with the standard in its entirety (Cotton, 2019, p. 92-95).  
Example 2 
 Subsection 115.64(a) states: 
Upon Learning of an allegation that an inmate was sexually abused, the first security staff 
member to respond to the report shall be required to: (1) Separate the alleged victim and 
abuser; (2) Preserve and protect any crime scene until appropriate steps can be taken to 
collect any evidence; (3) If the abuse occurred within a time period that still allows for 
the collection of physical evidence, request that the alleged victim not take any actions 
that could destroy physical evidence, including, as appropriate, washing, brushing teeth, 
changing clothes, urinating, defecating, smoking, drinking, or eating; and (4) If the abuse 
occurred within a time period that still allows for the collection of physical evidence, 
request that the alleged abuser not take any actions that could destroy physical evidence, 
including, as appropriate, washing, brushing teeth, changing clothes, urinating, 
defecating, smoking, drinking, or eating (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 25). 
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While the auditor for the Rush City 2017 audit provides evidence for parts one through three of 
this subsection, he does not mention anything about part four of this subsection. Regardless, he 
rules that the facility is in compliance with the standard as a whole (Zeegers, 2017, p. 16). While 
the previous example shows that sometimes auditors do not address certain subsections at all, 
this example displays that it is also sometimes the case that the auditors do address each 
subsection within a standard, but they fail to address all parts of the subsection. 
Table 1: Standards Not Fully Addressed by Facility 
Facility State Year Number of 
Unaddressed 
Subsections 
Number of 
Standards Not 
Fully 
Addressed 
Percentage of 
Standards Not 
Fully 
Addressed7  
Holman Alabama  2017 19 10 23.26% 
Easterling Alabama 2018 106 28 65.12% 
Elmore Alabama 2018 10 7 16.28% 
Santiam Oregon 2018 1 1 2.33% 
Two Rivers Oregon 2018 4 3 6.98% 
Warner Creek Oregon 2018 2 2 4.65 
Shakopee Minnesota 2017 6 4 9.30% 
Rush City Minnesota 2017 28 14 32.56% 
Willow River Minnesota 2018 16 9 20.93% 
Created with data gathered directly from the official audit reports. 
 
Table 2: Standards Not Fully Addressed by State 
State Punishment 
Rank 
Total Number of 
Unaddressed 
Subsections 
Total Number of 
Standards Not Full 
Addressed 
Percentage of 
Standards Not 
Fully Addressed8  
Alabama 9 135 45 34.88% 
Oregon 29 7 6 4.65% 
Minnesota 46 50 27 20.93% 
 
																																																								
7 Calculations are my own. There are 43 standards in total, so I divided the number of standards I 
found to be affected by 43 to get the percentages. 
 8Calculations are my own. There are 43 standards included in each audit, and three audits studied 
for each state, meaning that there are 129 standards examined for each state. Thus, I divided the total 
number of deficiency instances in each state by 129 to get the overall percentage of standards affected in 
each state.				
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 The data from the tables above indicate that, collectively, the three Oregon audits were 
the most robust based on this measure, followed by Minnesota, and then Alabama. The Pew 
punishment rankings list that Alabama is a more punitive state than Oregon, which is a more 
punitive state than Minnesota. Thus, if the quality of audits decreased with increased state 
punitiveness, we would expect Minnesota to perform best based on this measure, followed by 
Oregon, and then Alabama. Since this trend is not reflected in the data, this measure appears to 
support my hypothesis that increased audit quality does not necessarily follow from decreased 
state punitiveness. 
B. Policy Existence as Sole Proof of Policy Implementation 
The purpose of these PREA audits is to ensure that PREA policies are being translated 
into practice. Those who developed the audits recognized that mere policy existence is not 
enough. Rather, the audits are intended to find proof that the policy is actually being enforced (J. 
Abbate, personal communication, 2018). However, I find that in some cases, the only evidence 
cited in the Auditor Discussion to justify that a standard subsection is met is existence of a policy 
that addresses that subsection. 
Example 1 
 Standard 115.76 states: 
(a) Staff shall be subject to disciplinary sanctions up to and including termination for 
violating agency sexual abuse or sexual harassment policies. (b) Termination shall be the 
presumptive disciplinary sanction for staff who have engaged in sexual abuse. (c) 
Disciplinary sanctions for violations of agency policies relating to sexual abuse or sexual 
harassment (other than actually engaging in sexual abuse) shall be commensurate with 
the nature and circumstances of the acts committed, the staff member’s disciplinary 
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history, and the sanctions imposed for comparable offenses by other staff with similar 
histories. (d) All terminations for violations of agency sexual abuse or sexual harassment 
policies, or resignations by staff who would have been terminated if not for their 
resignation, shall be reported to law enforcement agencies, unless the activity was clearly 
not criminal, and to any relevant licensing bodies (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 29). 
In the Auditor Discussion for the Santiam 2018 audit, the auditor states: 
 
Agency policy 40.1.13 (09/01/2016), section XI. A-D (page 12), outlines PREA-related 
disciplinary sanctions for staff and includes all standard requirements. Policy indicates 
that, “Termination shall be the presumptive discipline for staff who has engaged in sexual 
abuse.” This policy (section XI.C. page 12) also specified that, “Disciplinary actions for 
violations of agency policies relating to sexual abuse or sexual harassment (other than 
actually engaging in sexual abuse) shall be commensurate with the nature and 
circumstances of the acts committed, the staff member’s disciplinary history, and the 
sanctions imposed for comparable offenses by other staff with similar histories” 
(Schubach, 2018, p. 102). 
Thus, we see that the auditor claims that the policy in place addresses all aspects of the standard. 
While she could have strengthened her discussion using further evidence such as documentation 
of disciplinary reports or staff interviews to prove that the policy is actually being enforced, she 
does no such thing. Regardless, she rules that since the Agency policy 40.1.13 exists, the facility 
is in compliance with Standard 115.76 (Schubach, 2018, p. 103). 
Example 2 
 Subsection 115.42(f) states, “Transgender and intersex inmates shall be given the 
opportunity to shower separately from other inmates” (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 20). The 
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Auditor Discussion for the Holman 2017 audit states, “Alabama Department of Corrections 
Administrative Policy 454 states (Page 16)… ‘…Transgender and intersex inmates shall be given 
the opportunity to shower separately from other inmates’” (Taylor, 2017, p. 24). So, we see that 
there is a policy in place that addresses Subsection 115.42(f). However, as in the last example, no 
further evidence is provided to prove that this portion of the policy is being translated into 
practice. Zero evidence of effective policy enforcement is presented. Despite this lack of 
evidence, the auditor determines that the facility is in compliance with Standard 115.42 (Taylor, 
2017, p. 24). 
Table 3: Policy Existence as Sole Proof of Policy Implementation by Facility 
Facility State Year Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/ 
Only Policy as 
Proof 
Number of 
Standards 
Inadequately 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Percentage 
of Standards 
Inadequately 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Holman Alabama 2017 11 7 16.28% 
Easterling Alabama 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Elmore Alabama 2018 12 7 16.28% 
Santiam Oregon 2018 11 3 6.98% 
Two Rivers Oregon 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Warner Creek Oregon 2018 3 1 2.33% 
Shakopee Minnesota 2018 17 6 13.95% 
Rush City Minnesota 2017 32 13 30.23% 
Willow River Minnesota 2018 3 2 4.65% 
Created with data gathered directly from the official audit reports. 
 
Table 4: Policy Existence as Sole Proof of Policy Implementation by State 
State Punishment 
Rank 
Total Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/ 
Only Policy as 
Proof 
Total Number of 
Standards 
Inadequately 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Percentage of 
Standards 
Inadequately 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Alabama 9 23 14 10.85% 
Oregon 29 14 4 3.10% 
Minnesota 46 52 21 16.28% 
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 The data from the tables above indicate that, collectively, the three Oregon audits were 
the most robust based on this measure, followed by Alabama, then Minnesota. Again, based on 
the Pew punishment rankings, if increased audit quality was correlated with decreased state 
punitiveness, we would expect Minnesota to perform best based on this measure, followed by 
Oregon, and then Alabama. Since the data does not reflect such a pattern, this measure is found 
to be in support of my hypothesis. 
C. Meeting Interview Requirements  
In 2017, as part of the Auditor Handbook, requirements were made regarding the 
minimum number of inmates the auditors have to interview based on the facility’s inmate 
population size. The requirements demand that a minimum number of both random and targeted 
inmates are interviewed. The categories for targeted inmates relate to things such as age, 
disability status, sexuality, and history of past abuse (PREA Management Office, 2017).9 
Table 5: Meeting Inmate Interview Requirements by Facility 
Facility  State Year Required 
Minimum 
Number 
of 
Random 
Inmate 
Interviews  
Actual 
Number 
of 
Random 
Inmate 
Interviews 
Required 
Minimum 
Number 
of 
Targeted 
Inmate 
Interviews  
Actual 
Number 
of 
Targeted 
Inmate 
Interviews 
Required 
Overall 
Minimum 
Number 
of Inmate 
Interviews  
Actual 
Overall 
Number of 
Inmate 
Interviews 
Holman AL 2017 15 26 15 8* 30 34 
Easterling AL 2018 20 22 15 22 40 44 
Elmore AL 2018 20 29 15 19 40 48 
Santiam OR 2018 13 24 13 7* 26 31 
Two 
Rivers 
OR 2018 20 30 20 21 40 51 
Warner OR 2018 13 14 13 16 26 30 																																																								
9 There are ten categories of targeted inmates in total: “Youthful Inmates,” “Inmates with a 
Physical Disability,” “Inmates who are Blind, Deaf, or Hard of Hearing,” “Inmates who are LEP [Limited 
English Proficient],” “Inmates with a Cognitive Disability,” “Inmates who Identify as Lesbian, Gay, or 
Bisexual,” “Inmates who Identify as Transgender or Intersex,” “Inmates in Segregated Housing for High 
Risk of Sexual Victimization,” “Inmates Who Reported Sexual Abuse,” and “Inmates Who Reported 
Sexual Victimization During Risk Screening” (PREA Management Office, 2017). 
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Creek 
Shakopee MN 2018 15 21 15 9* 30 30 
Rush City MN 2018 20 Unknown  20 Unknown 40 Unknown  
Willow 
River 
MN 2018 20 37 20 13* 40 50 
Created with data gathered directly from the official audit reports, as well as requirements from the 
PREA Prisons and Jails Standards. 
 
*Although this number is lower than the total minimum number of targeted inmate interviews required, 
the auditor explicitly states that the shortage is due to the fact that certain categories of targeted inmates 
were not present at the facility. Thus, the shortage of interviews is not considered to be a sign of lack of 
robustness; it is merely an indicator that certain categories of targeted inmates could not be interviewed 
because they did not exist at the facility being audited. 
 
Table 6: Meeting Overall Inmate Interview Requirement by State 
State Punishment Rank Did Audits Meet Overall 
Interview Requirement?  
Alabama 9 Yes 
Oregon 29 Yes 
Minnesota 46 Unknown 
 
As indicated in the tables above, with perhaps the exception of the Rush City 2018 audit, 
all of the audit reports show that the auditors conducted the required amount of inmate 
interviews. Regarding the Rush City audit, the auditor simply states that he interviewed 
“offenders,” but does not specify how many he interviewed overall and whether some of them 
satisfied the targeted inmate interview requirements (Zeegers, 2017, p. 2). Based off of the 
information provided, there is no way for us to know whether or not he met the interview 
requirements. 
 With that said, the general pattern appears to be that auditors across the board are meeting 
the interview requirements. There is no evidence of lack of interviews being conducted in the 
most punitive state, nor is there evidence of significant numbers of surplus interviews being 
conducted in the least punitive state. Thus, there does not appear to be a connection between 
state punitiveness and audit robustness based on this measure, and the findings are in support of 
my hypothesis. 
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D. Use of Inmate Interviews Where Appropriate 
The categories of inmates to be targeted for interviews were chosen because these 
inmates are believed to be particularly vulnerable populations (e.g., youth, the disabled) or else 
likely to have a first-hand understanding of how the prison handles allegations (e.g., inmates who 
reported sexual abuse, inmates who reported sexual victimization during risk screening). They 
were selected because they are believed to be able to provide unique insight into what the 
facilities do and do not do and thus whether or not they are in compliance with given standards 
(J. Abbate, personal communication, October 17, 2018). However, I find that it is common for 
these inmates to not be interviewed and cited in the Auditor Discussions regarding the standards 
that pertain to them. 
Example 1 
 Subsection 115.67(c) states: 
For at least 90 days following a report of sexual abuse, the agency shall monitor the 
conduct and treatment of inmates or staff who reported the sexual abuse and of inmates 
who were reported to have suffered sexual abuse to see if there are changes that may 
suggest possible retaliation by inmates or staff, and shall act promptly to remedy any 
such retaliation. Items the agency should monitor include any inmate disciplinary reports, 
housing, or program changes, or negative performance reviews or reassignments of staff. 
The agency shall continue such monitoring beyond 90 days if the initial monitoring 
indicates a continuing need (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 26). 
Given the content of this standard and given that inmates who report sexual abuse are one of the 
categories designated for targeted inmate interviews, it is not unreasonable to believe that input 
from inmates who have reported sexual abuse should be taken into account when determining 
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compliance with this standard. However, although the auditor for the Warner Creek 2018 claims 
she interviewed two inmates who reported abuse, she relies only on evidence such as policy and 
staff interviews to support her compliance determination for this subsection. She does not use 
any inmate testimony to bolster her argument (Aiken, 2018, p. 83-84). I would like to make it 
clear that she is not required to use inmate interviews as evidence for any given compliance 
determination, and by no means am I claiming that her compliance determination is inaccurate 
because she did not provide inmate interview support. However, I do believe that providing 
inmate testimony would have corroborated her other evidence and lent significant credibility to 
her compliance determination. To not have included their input in her Auditor Discussion seems 
a bit incomplete. 
Example 2 
Subsection 115.81(a) states: 
If the screening pursuant to § 115.41 indicates that a prison inmate has experienced prior 
sexual victimization, whether it occurred in an institutional setting or in the community, 
staff shall ensure that the inmate is offered a follow-up meeting with a medical or mental 
health practitioner within 14 days of the intake screening (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 
30). 
Given the content of this standard and given that inmates who reported sexual victimization 
duking risk screening are one of the categories designated for targeted inmate interviews, one 
might reasonably think that—if there were inmates available to interview at this facility who had 
reported sexual victimization during risk screening—then their input would be included to 
determine compliance with this standard. Indeed, the auditor for the Willow River 2018 audit 
claims that he interviewed two inmates that made such a report. However, as in the example 
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above, he only cites policy and staff interviews as evidence of compliance with this standard 
(Manville, 2018, p. 81). Again, while the lack of inmate testimony does not mean that the 
compliance determination was inaccurate, his Auditor Discussion would have been strengthened 
had he included inmate interviews as further proof of compliance. 
Table 7: Lacking Interview Evidence Where Appropriate by Facility 
Facility State Year Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/o 
Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 
Number of 
Standards 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/o 
Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 
Percentage of 
Standards 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
w/o Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 
Holman Alabama 2017 26 9 20.93% 
Easterling Alabama 2018 53 16 37.21% 
Elmore Alabama 2018 21 9 20.93% 
Santiam Oregon 2018 24 10 23.26% 
Two Rivers Oregon 2018 23 9 20.93% 
Warner Creek Oregon 2018 21 10 23.26% 
Shakopee Minnesota 2018 39 13 30.23% 
Rush City Minnesota 2017 29 11 25.58% 
Willow River Minnesota 2018 23 9 20.93% 
Created with data gathered directly from the official audit reports. 
 
Table 8: Lacking Interview Evidence Where Appropriate by Facility by State 
State Punishment 
Rank 
Total Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/o 
Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 
Total Number of 
Standards Deemed 
in Compliance w/o 
Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 
Percentage of 
Standards 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/o 
Relevant 
Interview 
Corroboration 10  
Alabama 9 100 34 56.67% 
Oregon 29 68 29 48.33% 
Minnesota 46 91 33 66.00% 
 
																																																								10	Calculations are my own. Using personal judgment, I decided that 20 of the 43 compliance 
determinations should be supported with inmate interview evidence. Since I studied three audits from 
each state, I divided the total number of standards deemed in compliance without relevant interview 
corroboration by 60 to arrive at this percentage. 	
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The data from the tables above indicate that, collectively, the three Oregon audits were 
the most robust based on this measure, followed by Alabama, then Minnesota. Again, we see that 
the robustness pattern is not in agreement with the Pew punishment rankings if it is the case that 
decreased state punitiveness is connected to increased audit robustness. In fact, in this instance, 
the least punitive state appears to be performing the poorest. Thus, these findings are in support 
of my hypothesis. 
E. Direct Contradictions 
Beginning with the 2018 audit template, auditors are required to check “Yes,” “No,” or 
“N/A,” to indicate if each subsection for each standard is met. For both 2016 and 2018 audits, the 
Auditor Discussion section is the portion of the audit where the auditor is provided space to 
explain the evidence they relied upon to make their compliance determination for each standard 
(National PREA Resource Center, 2018b). I was surprised to find that, in a few cases, the 
subsection determinations or the evidence cited in the Auditor Discussion directly contradicts the 
overall finding of compliance for the standard in question. 
Example 1 
 Subsection 115.78(d) states: 
If the facility offers therapy, counseling, or other interventions designed to address and 
correct underlying reasons or motivations for the abuse, the facility shall consider 
whether to require the offending inmate to participate in such interventions as a condition 
of access to programming or other benefits (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 30). 
When asked if the facility is in compliance with this subsection, the auditor for the Easterling 
2018 audit checks the “No” box, but then proceeds to give an overall compliance determination 
of “Meets Standard” (Barkley, 2018, p. 60). This is problematic, because for the facility to 
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comply with the standard, it must comply with all subsections of that standard (PREA 
Management Office, 2017). 
Example 2 
Subsection 115.53(b) states: 
The facility shall inform inmates, prior to giving them access [to outside confidential 
support services], of the extent to which such communications will be monitored and the 
extent to which reports of abuse will be forwarded to authorities in accordance with 
mandatory reporting laws (Department of Justice, 2012, p. 23). 
 In the Auditor Discussion for this standard in the Elmore 2018 audit, the auditor states: 
No addresses could be found and no information to inform inmates, prior to 
giving them access, of the extent to which such communications will be monitored and 
the extent to which reports of abuse will be forwarded to authorities in accordance with 
mandatory reporting laws (Cotten, 2018, p.53). 
Despite this statement, when asked if the facility is in compliance with this subsection, the 
auditor checks the “Yes” box, thus directly contradicting the evidence he provides (Cotton, 2018, 
p. 52).	
Table 9: Contradictory Findings by Facility 
Facility State Year Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed in 
Compliance w/ 
Contradictory 
Findings 
Number of 
Standards 
Incorrectly 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Percentage of 
Standards 
Incorrectly 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Holman Alabama 2017 0 0 0.00% 
Easterling Alabama 2018 3 3 .07% 
Elmore Alabama  2018 3 3 .07% 
Santiam Oregon 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Two Rivers Oregon 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Warner Creek Oregon 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Shakopee Minnesota 2018 0 0 0.00% 
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Rush City Minnesota 2017 0 0 0.00% 
Willow River Minnesota 2018 0 0 0.00% 
Created with data gathered directly from the official audit reports. 
 
Table 10: Contradictory Findings by State 
State Punishment 
Rank 
Total Number of 
Subsections 
Deemed In 
Compliance w/ 
Contradictory 
Findings 
Total Number of 
Standards 
Incorrectly 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Percentage of 
Standards 
Incorrectly 
Deemed in 
Compliance 
Alabama 9 6 6 4.65% 
Oregon 29 0 0 0.00% 
Minnesota 46 0 0 0.00% 
 
As did all of the other robustness measures, this measure derived from my original 
research on Alabama prisons. While it was not common to discover contradictory findings in the 
Alabama audits, the fact that there existed even a few examples of this occurrence was 
worrisome—there is absolutely no reason why an auditor should directly contradict his/herself. It 
is encouraging to find that in both the Oregon and Minnesota facilities studied here, there are no 
such occurrences. Although Alabama is the most punitive of these states according to Pew and is 
the only state I find to have contradictory findings, the fact that neither Oregon nor Minnesota 
have any instances of contradictory findings supports the claim that increased punitiveness is not 
linearly associated with decreased audit robustness. Thus, this robustness measure is in support 
of my hypothesis. 
VI. Discussion and Conclusions  
A. Summary of Findings  
 In sum, albeit with some caveats regarding certain robustness measures that were 
explained in their respective sections above, the findings in relation to all five of my measures 
appear to be in support of my hypothesis. Based on the Pew punishment rankings, if it were the 
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case that increased state punitiveness was correlated with decreased audit robustness, we would 
expect Minnesota to perform best in terms of any given measure, followed by Oregon, and then 
Alabama. My data indicates that this pattern is not reflected by any of the five measures.  
B. Importance of Findings 
My research is important for three primary reasons. The first is due to implications for the 
auditor certification process and review of audits. The second is due to implications for policy 
implementation. The third is due to implications for human rights and dignity. 
My findings display that audits consistently appear to fall short in at least some, if not 
many, respects. In no audit that I examined did the auditor perform impressively in terms of all 
five robustness measures. This is a disheartening finding that indicates a clear problem, but one 
whose source is not yet clear. Whether it is that applicants are not being vetted properly when 
being considered for acceptance into the certification program, the certification process itself is 
inadequate, or some other unclear reason, the end result is that the audits continue to be 
completed less thoroughly than would be desired, and thus inmates are not being protected as 
well as they should be.   
Given the apparent shortcomings of the audits, it is not unreasonable to argue that the 
PREA Management Office should be making a concerted effort to review audits diligently when 
they are submitted to the National PREA Resource Center. As mentioned above, while each 
audit is required to be submitted to NPRC and is checked to see if the facility was found to be in 
compliance, there is no process in place to review the audits in detail and ensure that they are 
being completed thoroughly. Thus, audits of poor quality have a high chance of never being 
detected, less-than-acceptable auditors are never flagged for additional training or decertification, 
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and inmates are left without adequate protective measures in place (J. Abbate, personal 
communication, October 17, 2018). 
Moving on to implications for policy implementation, research shows that translating 
written policy into actual practice can be exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, even when policies 
appear to have been implemented well and to be achieving their desired effects, much can be left 
wanting (Orange, 2016). My findings serve as a supportive example of both of these claims.  
PREA legislation exists, but my research indicates that it is not always being enforced. 
This is likely the case for any number of other pieces of legislation pertaining to any number of 
other issue areas. Be that as it may, I feel that it is common for people to fall prey to the 
misconception that once we create a policy, the bulk of the battle is over and the problem is well 
on its way to being solved. My research shows that this is not the case. Rather, we must continue 
to follow the development of a policy and how it is being implemented in order to know if it is 
truly doing what it was intended to do. 
Furthermore, my findings show that simply looking at results on paper is not enough. 
According to the final audit reports, the facilities comply with the national standards, and thus it 
would appear that PREA policy has been implemented effectively. Yet, as my research displays, 
if you actually take a closer look at the Auditor Discussions, you see that facilities are being 
found to be compliant without adequate evidence supporting these determinations. This is a 
major cause for concern if we are genuinely invested in discovering how well PREA audits are 
holding facilities accountable.  
With that said, most people would not even think to be skeptical of the audit findings. For 
many, it would be natural to see the overall compliance determinations and be pleased that 
PREA appears to be doing its job. Thus, the public might begin to hold the false belief that 
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PREA is achieving more success than it actually is. Believing that the inmate sexual assault 
epidemic is being adequately handled, they then may not push for further efforts to be 
undertaken even if they are, in reality, needed. 
This same process of misunderstanding and consequently failing to take action likely 
applies well beyond PREA, affecting all sorts of different issue areas. When results on paper 
appear to indicate one thing but a closer analysis suggests another, we become at risk of naively 
and mistakenly believing that problems are being solved when truly they are not. This false sense 
of security can greatly influence the steps we choose to take (or not take) going forward and thus 
can severely impact outcomes in any given field. 
Beyond policy and policymaking considerations, my findings also have implications for 
the protection of human rights. Sexual assault is traumatizing and its consequences are often 
exacerbated when the victim is incarcerated. The adverse effects its survivors experience range 
from the physical to the emotional to the psychological and can burden a person for a lifetime, 
leading to dysfunctionality and even further negative social impacts (Rape, Abuse & Incest 
National Network, 2018). My findings show that the auditing process that PREA put into place 
to protect inmates from sexual abuse leaves something to be desired. Without the audits 
adequately fulfilling their purpose, inmates continue to be at risk of experiencing sexual abuse 
and suffering from all of the negative effects that this abuse entails.  
In the Background section of this paper, I mentioned that PREA claims to have nine 
purposes. Notably, one of these is to “increase the accountability of prison officials who fail to 
detect, prevent, reduce, and punish prison rape” (108th Congress, 2003, p. 4). While 
accountability may have increased, my findings show that prison officials are far from being held 
truly accountable. Thus, the overall promise of PREA, “…to provide information, resources, 
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recommendations, and funding to protect individuals from prison rape” remains unkept (108th 
Congress, 2003). 
C. Shortcomings of Study and Suggestions for Further Research 
 It should be explicitly stated that my findings are not meant to be interpreted as proving 
anything. While the study was intended to broaden the scope of my previous research, it still 
examines only nine particular audits from three particular states conducted during a span of three 
particular years, and thus its findings cannot be said to be reflective of what we might find if we 
explored all fifty states over a longer period of time. What’s more, my ability to compile data 
was at times limited by the information made available in the audits. So, perhaps the findings are 
representative of national trends, but perhaps not. Given that such a small number of audits is 
studied—and is studied without the use of any sort of advanced technical tool— to make any 
sweeping claims regarding robustness patterns would be irresponsible. Moving forward, similar 
examinations (hopefully utilizing established analytical tools) on audits from all fifty states from 
a wider range of years would likely prove to be insightful.  
 Furthermore, my study focuses specifically on the quality of audits on prisons. However, 
as mentioned above, PREA national standards apply to all types of confinement facilities (e.g., 
jails, juvenile detention facilities, immigration detention facilities) (Department of Justice, 2012). 
To attempt to ensure protection of inmates/detainees of all types, it would be helpful for future 
research to examine audits on these other types of facilities, as they might find that audit 
robustness varies dramatically based on the type of facility being audited.  
 My findings support the hypothesis that state punitiveness is not associated with audit 
quality. By some measures, the audits vary significantly in their robustness, but these differences 
do not appear to be related to state punitiveness. So, if all auditors go through the same 
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application and certification process, what could explain differences in audit quality? Is it simply 
a matter of the individual conducting the audit? Are audits completed by teams of auditors 
perhaps more thorough than audits completed by a single person? Future research would be wise 
to explore these questions and others. 
Notably, the Oregon audits collectively either perform the best or are tied for the best by 
all robustness measures. Additionally, as I was going through the audits line by line, the Oregon 
audits certainly stood out as being the most detailed. As my research only factors in the variable 
of punitiveness and indicates that punitiveness is not the explanation for varying degrees of audit 
quality, it leaves us searching for an alternative explanation as to why Oregon outperforms the 
other states. While my research did not intend to look for patterns related to demographic factors, 
I did notice an intriguing finding regarding gender. All of the Oregon audits were conducted by 
women, whereas all of the Alabama and Minnesota audits were conducted by men. As such, it 
would be insightful to examine a larger selection of audits by auditor gender and see if this trend 
proves to be more widely applicable. Alternatively, future research could examine audit quality’s 
relationship to variables such as geographic location of facility, age of auditors, years of auditing 
experience of auditors, or any number of other factors. Through this type of focused research, 
hopefully we would begin to find answers regarding which factors contribute to producing the 
highest quality audits. With this deepened understanding, we would be better equipped to serve 
our country’s inmate population and work to provide them the protection that all human beings 
deserve. 
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